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Simulating the Impact of Regulation Changes on the Market for Prostitution Services
Marina Della Giusta*
This paper introduces an economic approach to studying prostitution, critically assessing 
the current limitations of economists’ contribution to this important policy debate and 
illustrating the relative merits of economic modelling for policy design. The first part of 
the paper reviews the principal contribution to prostitution debates that have informed 
the formulation of the approach adopted here, and indicates how it differs from other 
social scientific approaches and from existing work addressing these issues in 
economics. Central to the approach is the recognition of the role of social stigma in 
determining the configuration of the exchange of paid sex, and the way in which it is in 
turn understood and affected by policy (for a discussion of the link between stigma and 
regulation see Sanders 2007). Drawing on an economic model of the market for 
prostitution services analysing the interaction between demand and supply for paid sex 
(Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Stroem 2007), the second part describes ways in which 
different regulatory regimes are chosen by policy makers. 
On the part of economists, and also to a large extent feminist economists, there 
has until recently been a curious reluctance to engage with prostitution as an area of 
socio-economic life that mobilises large numbers of people and vast amounts of financial 
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resources internationally. This is all the more surprising since paid sex is, depending on 
its regulation, either formally or informally part of the entertainment industry, where 
issues of regulation and labour conditions, particularly given the importance of 
international migration to the sector, are all well known to economists. The failure to 
analyse systematically a form of exchange that has many of the features that much recent 
research in economics claims to want to understand is bewildering, given that the 
exchange of paid sex appears to incorporate rather obviously issues connected with 
information and power asymmetries in exchange,1 the relationship between formal and 
informal markets, and the role of regulation in fragmented markets. In addition, the 
dynamics of international labour mobility, the allocation of resources within the 
household, women’s entrepreneurship, and pathways out of poverty and social exclusion 
are also implicated. There is an unfortunate parallel between the lack of acknowledgment 
of prostitution as a form of work in policymaking and in the economic discipline, which 
by neglecting areas of human economic activity, contributes to their delegitimisation. 
Given the relevance of the economic profession to policy makers, there is a need for 
economic research addressing this neglected area of enquiry, learning from the evidence 
from the sex sector as well as the work carried out in other disciplines. 
This paper forms part of a broad economic investigation which was initially 
inspired by the publication of a contribution by economists to the prostitution literature 
that appeared to be based on very limited knowledge of the sex industry and on several 
                                                
1 See the seminal work of Fred Hirsch (1977) and Pagano (1999), widely used among other fields in 
cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining model of the family. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
rather unsatisfactory assumptions (alas, a common feature of our discipline) (see Edlund 
and Korn 2002). The aim is to contribute an economic understanding of the paid sex 
exchange that provides opportunities for discussion with other disciplines as well as with 
policy makers. The discussion begins with an illustration of the main ideas underpinning 
the economic model contained in Della Giusta et al. (2007), which is then enlarged to 
illustrate the choice of policy regimes by policy makers. 
Economics and Prostitution
The economic literature has traditionally approached prostitution either showing how it is 
similar to other markets, or studying it as a form of crime and analysing the costs and 
benefits of alternative regulatory regimes, generally agreeing that the main motivation 
behind supply is an economic one (for a review, see Reynolds 1986). More recent 
theoretical and empirical contributions have focussed on modelling prices and supply 
characteristics (Cameron et al 1999; Moffatt and Peters 2001; Edlund and Korn 2002; 
Cameron, 2002), demand determinants (Cameron and Collins 2003), health risk and the 
effect of condom use on prostitute’s earnings (Rao et al 2001; Gertler et al 2003), and, 
more recently, the evolution of paid sex markets and the ways in which urban spaces 
favour sexual transactions (Collins 2004). The latter collection is much broader in scope, 
with paid sex markets being studied as part of the wider sexual market in which people 
seek partners for reasons that include deficiencies in amount or range of sexual activities 
in which they participate, or diversification of sexual consumption (Collins 2004, 1634). 
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Edlund and Korn (2002) have contentiously modelled prostitution as a highly paid, low 
skill female occupation alternative to marriage, explaining high wages in terms of a loss 
of position in the marriage market.2 Cameron (2002) provides a more sophisticated 
explanation for high wages in terms of compensation for social exclusion, risk (assault, 
disease, arrest, punishment), front loading in wage profile (informal pension scheme or 
insurance), boredom and physical effort, distaste (potential psychological and physical 
costs), loss of recreational sex pleasure, anti-social and inconvenient hours, possible 
excess demand and prices used to screen quality, taboos, and agent fees. Moffatt and 
Peters (2001) find that prices are affected by duration of the transaction, location, and age 
of the prostitute, but that other factors affect client satisfaction. Stigma enters these 
models in the form of a barrier faced by prostitutes when wanting to enter other 
professions, but it is unrelated to the nature of the transaction between prostitute and 
client. Cameron and Collins (2003, 274) model male clients’ decision to enter the market 
for prostitution services, where he has the choice to derive utility from one relationship 
partner and/or one paid sex partner. They distinguish between the motivations of men in 
relationships (variety, specific acts, frequency, outlet for stress) and single men (‘relative 
search costs of finding willing sexual partners, or partners wiling to engage in specific 
sexual activities in an ad hoc or formal social context, and in a given time period.’ An 
econometric study of the characteristics of male demand for street prostitution services, 
with the aim of assessing the significance of different types of clients’ motivations is 
contained in Della Giusta et al. (2007b). Garofalo (2002) is so far the only explicitly 
feminist contribution, and focuses on explaining the different prices paid in the different 
prostitution sub-markets in terms of the power asymmetries between contractual parties, 
                                                
2 For a detailed critique see Della Giusta et al (2007)
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discussing the role of female prostitution in the construction of male identity. The latter 
would be at least partly based on asserting control over women through the paid sexual 
transaction, thereby confirming one’s gender identity through the relationship with the 
opposite one. This links quite well with the evidence from female clients, which exploit 
various existing ‘othering’ mechanisms based on class and race, to assert difference and, 
through the exercise of economic power, control over the male sex workers whose 
services they buy (see below). Della Giusta et al (2007b) analyse empirically the role of 
control in demand for sexual services and find that the desire for control is indeed a 
significant component of demand.
Using an Economic Model of Prostitution to Investigate Policy Alternatives
The usefulness of economic modelling is that, as long as it is based on valid stylised facts 
(that is, recurrences encountered in empirical evidence), models can be an extremely 
useful tool for testing hypotheses, and one whose validity can continuously be checked 
against empirical evidence. This, of course, is as long as all simplifying assumptions 
(especially those relating to ceteris paribus, that is the idea that no other factors affecting 
the model’s variables, and not included in the model, will not change simultaneously with 
the policy parameters of interest) are borne in mind when discussing the policy 
implications stemming from the model’s results. The economic model of prostitution 
developed in Della Giusta et al (2007) is in the standard rational action tradition (based 
on the idea that agents make decisions based on the information available to them and 
having evaluated possible alternatives), but differs in that it contains representative agents 
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who are social beings interested, in varying degrees, in the effect of their actions on their 
reputations, which are socially constructed, both in the sense that they are ascribed rather 
than intrinsic characteristics, and in the sense that they are affected by what other agents 
do (so that the relative diffusion of behaviour makes it more acceptable). The economic 
sociology literature on embeddedness and social capital (Granovetter 1985; Bordieu 
1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Mansky 2000) points to two distinct ways in which 
reputations matter to economic agents: first because, as social beings, they derive utility 
(or satisfaction) from a positive evaluation by others in the social groups they belong to 
(Casson 1991), and secondly, because they are aware of the costs that social sanctions 
may impose on their material progress (Akerlof 1980; Arnott and Stiglitz 1991). 
Reputation has thus both intrinsic and instrumental value: it is desired per se and 
can be used to access other earning opportunities. Stigma can thus be understood as a loss 
of reputation which affects social standing for both clients and sex workers, as well as 
pay and working conditions in the sex trade and access to services and other jobs for sex 
workers. The model also incorporates personal differences in concern for reputation 
depending on agents’ personal characteristics and the specific moment at which they 
exercise choice (so that people are allowed to differ and also to be inconsistent in their 
choices). This is important in order to describe situations of individuals with high 
reputation who disregard the effects of their actions, which would be otherwise construed 
as irrational behaviour. The model considered both the case in which reputational 
endowments are exogenous (that is not affected by behaviour within the sex industry) and 
the situation when those endowments are considered endogenous, that is a situation in 
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which if a higher quantity of prostitution is sold or bought in the economy the stigma 
effect decreases. The second key assumption of the model is that the demand for sex and 
the demand for paid sex are not perfect substitutes to reflect the fact that other 
motivations, such as desire for control (explored at the empirical level in Della Giusta et 
al 2007b), underpin demand. Findings from empirical studies of clients suggest that
personal characteristics (personal and family background, self-perception, perceptions of 
women, sexual preferences), economic factors (education, income, work), as well as 
attitudes towards risk (health hazard and risk of being caught where sex work is illegal), 
lack of interest in conventional relationships, desire for variety in sexual acts or sexual 
partners, and viewing sex as a commodity, are all likely to affect demand. For example, 
Pitts et al (2004) surveyed a sample of 1225 men and women in Australia3  and found 
that 23.4% had paid for sex at least once. They reported paying for sex to satisfy sexual 
needs (43.8%), because paying for sex is less trouble (36.4%), and because it is 
entertaining (35.5%). Significantly, the researchers found that there were not many 
significant differences between men who had paid for sex and those who had not, except 
that the ones who had were on average older, less likely to have university education and 
to have had a regular partner in the previous year. The motivations of sex workers’ clients 
in the UK (who were all males and appeared to be representatives of all sectors of 
                                                
3 The sample was taken by distributing a survey to customers of a Sexpo exhibition hold in Melbourne 
2001. This is a commercial event hosting a wide range of exhibitors of products associated with sex; of 
4.905 respondents, 1225 received a version of the questionnaires with questions on sex workers. Among 
1225 respondents , 612 were men and 601 were women. 
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society) studied in the course of a programme4 on the sex industry presented by Channel 
4 appeared to convey the impression that a connection existed between the effort and 
costs associated with finding a sexual partner who would readily satisfy their sexual 
preferences, and the straightforward and readily accessible option of sex work. Similar 
findings are reported by Coy, Horvath and Kelly (2007) on buyers of sex in East 
London,5 as well as by Campbell (1998) and Sanders (2008). This is confirmed by 
Thorbek and Pattanaik (2002), who draw a sort of “psychological” profile of male sex 
tourists on the basis of their own descriptions of themselves and accounts of their 
experiences. This indicates that many of them are finding relationships with others very 
difficult (either because they do not have the time or the skills required to meet people) 
and choose sex tourism as an “easier” alternative, which does not imply any 
responsibility towards the person providing the sexual service. As for the views they held 
of sex workers, it appears that both sexism and racism mix in determining a very marked 
distancing, which allow sex tourists to practically ignore and show no interest in the lives 
and working motivations of the sex workers whose services they buy. Wider phenomena 
connected to consumerism and globalisation are also clearly related to this industry, 
which reflects multiple power structures: Marttila (2003) concludes from her study of 
Finnish clients that: ‘the sex business is first and foremost about gendered, economic, 
social and cultural – global and local – power structures (Marttila 2003, 8).  Thus, 
different intersections of gender, race and class all contribute to the creation of ‘othering’ 
mechanisms that serve to both distance the parties to an exchange and justify the 
                                                
4 Dispatches: Sex on the Street; Channel 4 season Prostitution –The Laws Don’t Work, Channel 4, 
September 2002
5 http://www.cwasu.org/displayAuthorsPublications.asp?author_key=51
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assertion of economic power within it. This phenomenon is obviously not limited to paid 
sex exchanges, and has been widely documented across a range of personal services (see 
e.g. Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003). 
As stated in the previous section, gender is also not the only variable at play: 
women clients are also engaging in sex tourism, as documented both in Thorbek and
Pattanaik, and in Sanchez Taylor (2001). The latter, in particular, offers a more in-depth 
analysis of North American and Northern European women buying sex work services of 
young men in the Caribbean, in what they themselves describe as ‘romance holidays’. 
Responses to her interviews suggest that, on the one hand, women clients are mostly 
reluctant to define what they engage in as prostitution, and, on the other, that their ideas 
about the young men whose service they buy are deeply rooted in racist ideas about black 
men and black men’s sexuality. The theme of inequality appears to be at the core of the 
relationship: prejudices that allow the stigmatisation of another person as fundamentally 
“different” and inferior to oneself appear again and again in customers’ accounts (Ben-
Israel et al. 2005; Pitts et al 2004; Kern 2000; Blanchard 1994). 
Given these assumptions, the model predicts that client will participate in the 
‘market’ for paid sex if their marginal willingness to pay for exceeds the price of paid 
sex, plus the marginal costs of a worsened reputation. The higher their reputation 
capacity (or ability to withstand stigma) , the lower is the marginal cost from reputation 
effects of consuming prostitution, and the more likely it is that prostitution is consumed. 
Conversely, an individual will start to sell sex if the price of paid sex exceeds its 
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opportunity cost, again in terms of reputation and alternative uses of one’s time: the 
higher the price of paid sex, the more likely it is that an individual will supply 
prostitution; the lower the availability of alternative income, the more likely it is that the 
individual will take part in the prostitution industry; and the lower the effect of stigma on 
sex workers, the more likely it is that prostitution will be sold.  The equilibrium amount 
of prostitution sold and bought in the market (S*) is a function of the exogenous 
parameters: reputation capacities of sex workers (Rp) and clients (Rc) and other sources of 
income for sex workers (Hp). The table below describes the changes in both quantity and 
price (w) of prostitution that result from increases in reputations and alternative earnings.
Table 1. Changes in supply and wages of sex workers resulting from increases in 
reputation capacities and other earning options
Change in Rc Rp Hp
S* + + +
W + - -
Column 2 shows that more prostitution is sold at a higher price to clients with a 
high reputation capacity, that is individuals who are able to cover to a great extent their 
consumption of prostitution. 
Column 3 suggests that if it is difficult to have one’s reputation ruined by being 
found out as a prostitute, then a lot of prostitution will be sold at a low price. This is 
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consistent with the evidence of some temporary immigrant prostitutes in Europe who aim 
to work in prostitution only for a limited amount of time to accumulate savings and then 
return to their country (see Thorbeke and Pattanaik 2002; Corso and Trifirò 2003).
Column 4 states that the fewer the alternative earning opportunities (Hp high), the 
more prostitution is sold at a lower price. This is consistent with the evidence from 
Thailand and other sex tourism destinations where the lack of alternative livelihoods and 
the power structures within households are important determinants of supply.
In the light of the examples above, policies that were to recognise prostitution as a 
job and reduce the associated stigma would have the effect of increasing the marginal net 
gain of supplying prostitution, and increase the marginal willingness to pay for 
prostitution. This should, in a closed economy, have the effect of increasing the price of 
prostitution and, given the same availability of alternative earning opportunities (if there 
are constant intermediation margins), also increase the quantity supplied. However, in an 
open economy, there always is immigration of illegal workers and out-migration of 
clients (sex tourism), which would help keeping prices low. Policies that increase the 
stigma of being clients, conversely, increase the costs associated with being caught for 
clients. Here, the expectation is that the marginal willingness to pay for prostitution 
would fall, as would the quantity of prostitution sold and the equilibrium price. However,
the evidence from countries that criminalise clients seems to suggest that the response is 
often a ‘going underground’ of the sex industry, which increases the risks to which sex 
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workers are exposed and does not decrease demand (Sanders 2005), as illustrated by the 
evidence from community action and displacement of prostitution (Hubbard 1998). 
Another strategy followed by intervention programmes has been that of increasing 
alternative earning opportunities for prostitutes. The effect of these policies will be felt 
only on that part of prostitution which is supplied for lack of earning alternatives. This
implies a fall in part of the supply which will not affect demand and therefore, in an open 
economy setting, might simply generate displacement of demand, rather than less 
prostitution being sold at a higher price. Again, this is consistent with the immigration of 
sex workers operating in the informal sex market which exists in countries that have 
legalised and have permeable borders (Netherlands).
Thinking About the Effect of Changing Social Norms
The effect of social norms on people’s behaviour has been discussed in economics in the 
context of studying the ways in which social codes change depending on their degree of 
acceptance. In particular Akerlof’s theory of social custom (Akerlof 1980) incorporates 
reputation in individual’s preferences, and discusses the range of possible market 
equilibria that exist depending on whether people tend to generally believe or disregard a 
particular social code within the range of existing ones. This theory was used in our 
model as a foundation to be able to discuss the ways in which  prostitution is stigmatised 
in different societies. Following the approach of Akerlof, changing social attitudes 
towards prostitution can be expected to produce different market equilibria in terms of 
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the amount of prostitution exchanged, and the price of the service.  The reputation 
function in Akerlof depends on the individual’s obedience of the social code and the 
proportion of the population who believe in that code. Given an increase in demand for 
sexual services (as documented for example by Day and Ward for the UK), following 
Akerlof’s theory, one would  expect that more people would find the exchange of paid 
sex acceptable, which would appear to be confirmed by data from the UK Survey of 
Sexual Attitudes. Similarly, Della Giusta et al (2007) investigated the effect of market 
size on stigmatisation of both customers and sex workers, and suggested different 
scenarios depending on the degree of independence of mores from behaviour.  The rest of 
this paper is concerned with another aspect of stigmatisation, namely the degree to which 
policy makers’ reputations are affected by the kind of prostitution policy they adopt.
Prostitution Policy
Introducing policy makers in the simple framework outlined above is no simple matter, as 
the motivation for regulating this activity is as complex as society’s attitude towards it. 
Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that most policy regimes have evolved in 
piecemeal fashion over time, with legislation not explicitly addressing sex work having 
an important effect. Penal codes reform, public health, social insurance and taxation 
regimes all play a major part, and more recently concerns over immigration and public 
order and security are exerting a major influence on policies addressing the sex trade. 
Defining different ‘regimes’ should therefore not create the impression that there are 
coherent alternative models that policy markers choose from. Nonetheless, it seems 
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useful to distinguish between the main currently existing models and illustrate how an 
economic approach to discussing their relative merits would operate. Historically, the 
prevailing concern informing policies addressing prostitution has been moral and legal 
sanctioning of those involved in the trade, being directed in different mixtures at sex 
workers, their clients, or those who organise in a variety of ways the sex trade. The ways 
in which intermediaries have been addressed by policy is often used as an illustration of 
the failure to understand the complexity of this activity, with pimps being used as catch-
all term comprising anyone from people traffickers, to parlour managers and apartment 
owners, to pushers and sex workers’ partners. Policies addressing prostitution directly or 
indirectly have also been influenced by women’s movements and feminist discourses in 
varying degree, as illustrated by Outshoorn (2004). The welfare of workers in the sex 
industry has sometimes featured in the discussions, although this has often been 
accompanied by a rather one-sided understanding of their agency (a point repeatedly 
discussed in this collection). 
In order to describe the main different regimes, Outshoorn’s definitions are 
adopted (2004, 8). According to these, abolitionism describes the position whereby 
prostitution should be banned and third parties, but not prostitutes, criminalised. 
Prohibitionism indicates instead that all prostitution is declared illegal and parties are 
held liable to penalties. Finland, for example, moved from being a purely abolitionist 
regime, with no penalties for prostitutes and sanctions against pimps only to a regime of 
strong prohibition, which has outlawed prostitutes, clients and pimps (Holli 2004). As is 
often the case the application of the law differs markedly from the intent of the legislator, 
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and the local prostitution ban in Helsinki only resulted in criminalisation of prostitutes 
rather than clients. Regulation means that the state intervenes in the ways in which the 
sex industry is run: for example, Australia has seen a trend towards the legalisation of 
prostitution, with street walking being legal in New South Wales and brothels and escort 
agencies being legal in a further four territories or states (Sullivan 2004). Most countries 
fall somewhere between these categories - for example, Austria’s approach has been 
defined as simultaneously regulatory and prohibitive since the legislation on social 
insurance recognises prostitution as form of work but one which is coercive and immoral 
(Sauer 2004). Prostitution is permitted in Vienna but not in the provinces, and regulated 
through registration of prostitutes (although it is estimated that less than 10% of 
prostitutes are registered and 85% are migrant women) and zoning. Meanwhile, brothels 
are legal, but not bars and private apartments (although prostitution is legal in clients’ 
apartments).
The further category of decriminalisation should also be included in the present 
discussion, since it has featured quite extensively in discussions in both Canada and the 
UK, particularly in responses to the consultation launched by the Home Office (Home 
Office 2004). This approach essentially entails minimal policing and non-intervention. 
Canada makes it legal to be a prostitute but prohibits all forms of communication for the 
purposes of prostitution and has dealt with it mostly as a public nuisance (Jeffery 2004). 
This is in spite of the attempt to decriminalise following the Fraser’s committee 
recommendations in the late 1980s which went unheeded as the change to a conservative 
government meant renewed pressure to treat it as a law and order issue.
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Recent reforms in the UK following the consultation by the Home Office (2004 
and 2006) entailed a shift from a traditionally abolitionist to an almost prohibitionist 
regime. There probably are several underlying motives for a move which has discounted 
expert opinion from a range of scholars, activists and sex workers organisations and 
pushed towards a stated policy of eliminating sex work by a mixture of exiting and 
repatriation of immigrant prostitutes, and the adoption of a punitive stance towards 
clients. Without entering the (de)merits of the actual policy instruments that are being 
proposed and/or adopted in England and Wales (which are discussed at length by other 
contributors to this collection), it appears that beneath this change in attitude lies the 
desire to meet the demands of rather conservative voters (for whom no inconsistency may 
occur between anti-immigration and anti- kerb crawling views and liberal sex attitudes). 
This is not surprising, being in line with many of the policies affecting civil liberties 
currently underway, and not inconsistent with the traditional description of policy 
makers’ behaviour, once their reputation and its effect on re-election chances is 
considered. Policy makers are usually described in terms of the maximisation of a public 
welfare function (including costs and benefits to the public from different options) under 
constraints which describe both the relationships between the variables that are outside 
the policy makers’ control (such as the relationship between inflation and interest rates, 
or the process of expectations formation) and the incentives of the policy makers (often 
associated with maintaining power). 
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To keep matters simple, let us assume here three different types of costs reflecting 
the discussion above: policing, administration and public health (indicated by cp, ca and 
ch, respectively). Policing costs include both the cost of monitoring and arresting, as well 
as the costs from crimes associated with the sex industry. These are assumed to be higher 
the more punitive the policy regime. Administration costs refer to those from supporting 
exit strategies in abolitionism (if this is done) and to those from licensing in the case of 
regulation, and they are assumed here to be the smallest source of costs and smaller than 
the tax gains from regulation. Public health costs include those associated with sexually 
transmitted diseases as well as those coming from the other physical and mental damages 
sustained by sex workers, who feature disproportionately amongst victims of violent 
crime. Evidence suggests that repressive regimes (prohibition and abolition) increase 
these costs by pushing prostitution underground and making it difficult for sex workers to 
protect themselves (see Sanders 2007). Let us also make no assumption regarding the 
relative magnitudes of policing and health costs6.
Let us also assume that policy makers, like clients and sex workers, have 
reputations (indicated by RG) which reflect their current rating by the general public, and 
can increase or decrease their rating depending on the policies they adopt, and whether 
                                                
6 Note that we are not assuming any ‘public nuisance’ costs here, as the evidence reviewed by the author on 
regulated streetwalking areas suggests that the perceived sharp trade-off between safe neighbourhoods and 
streetwalking is largely a result of mis-representation: well managed street walking zones are 
overwhelmingly located away from residential areas, which tend instead to become used for soliciting in 
the absence of regulation (and often in association with repressive regimes). For a discussion of 
displacement see Collins and Judge, in this issue.
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these shift opinion in their favour. The point of the electoral cycle of course matters too: 
the relative importance of reputation will increase the closer to term, since the closer to 
term it gets, the more the policy maker will be interested in swaying votes it its favour 
(particularly those from swing voters). Switching between regimes will thus depend on 
the actual reputation enjoyed by the policy maker and the proximity to elections. If swing 
voters tend to have views that are fairly conservative, they will be less impressed by 
liberal policies which may make the sex industry more acceptable and visible (such as 
regulated brothels), and more in favour of policies that curb it or at least make it less 
visible. This latter point is rather crucial, since some of the perceived inconsistency of 
Government policy possibly reflects the attempt to achieve the latter goal, even when the 
former is stated in principle. It is useful to see, given the assumptions made, what overall 
incentives the policy maker has to switch away from an existing policy regime. Looking 
at the separate components of the policy maker’s payoff first, and taking prohibition as 
the basic case, the table below suggests how these may be summarised, given the 
assumptions outlined above.
Table 2: Changes in policy maker’s payoffs when switching from prohibition to 
different regimes
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Policy regimes Reputation 
effect
Taxes 
on sex 
work
Ts
Policing 
Costs
cp
Administration 
Costs
ca
Health 
costs
ch
Prohibition 
(baseline)
None None
Abolitionism ?* 0 0 + 0
Legalisation ?* + - + -
Decriminalisation ?* 0 - - -
?* = depends on public views
Thus, if all the above assumptions hold, a Government wishing to increase public 
welfare whilst simultaneously preserving its chances of re-election would move towards 
less repressive regimes if elections are far away, as these options increase public health 
and reduce policing costs. However, the same Government will not move away from 
prohibition if it is close to elections and wishes to maximise its reputation with swing 
voters. Extending this line of reasoning, a switch from less liberal to more liberal regimes 
will only occur if the Government is either sure of re-election or far away from it. These
results are based on social cost-benefit calculations, but little evidence exists that these 
are actually performed when deciding between policy options towards this sector, as in 
other ‘morally contentious’ policy areas (e.g. drugs).
Conclusions
The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it hopes to show how economists can 
engage in discussions with other disciplines on the complex issues surrounding 
prostitution. On the other, it seeks to demonstrate how an economic approach can 
illuminate more clearly some of the outcomes of policy decisions on participants in the 
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sex trade, and society more largely, and therefore help policy makers to adopt more 
systematic approaches based on rigorous evaluation of the costs and benefits associated 
with different regimes. 
At the centre of the approach adopted here is the recognition that stigma plays in 
prostitution, and the effect it has not just on the reputation of the parties directly involved, 
but on that of policy makers too. On this basis, a very simple rational action model based 
on stylised facts from sex trade would suggest liberal policies that maximise public 
welfare by lifting stigma associated with sector. But, as has been demonstrated, the same 
rational action model also helps to illustrate why politicians adopt what has often been 
described as hypocritical behaviour, choosing more repressive regimes which 
demonstrably worsen the lives of sex workers remaining in the trade, as well as those of 
society at large.
Appendix
Formally, if the policy maker maximises the following utility function incorporating both 
its own reputation and public welfare:
Max U (RG, - C) 
where C is a cost function increasing in all its components C (cp , ca , ch ) which has an 
identifiable minimum value, and reputation has a fixed component and a variable 
component rG reflecting the effect of changing prostitution policy, whose relevance 
depends on the closeness to election trG > 0 with 0<t<1 where t=1 is election time.
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Thus maximising the policy makers’ utility will require simultaneously maximising 
reputation and minimising costs, that is satisfying the following:
trG = Uc’C’ 
if elections are far, that is t=0, then the policy maker will switch to a regime that 
minimises costs. Conversely, at election time t=1 and if swing voters are relatively 
conservative, the policy maker will switch to a regime that increases costs of an amount 
equal to the reputation increase that the policy maker requires in order to get re-elected. 
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